Refugees and Politics in Uganda by Nabuguzi, Emmanuel
.. 
MAKERERE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (MISR) 
WORKSHOP ON "UGANDA AND REFUGEE PRGBLEMS" 
20THE DECEMBER 1993, IN THE LOWER LECTURE 
THEATRE, FACULTY OF ARTS 
MAKERERE UNIVERSITY. 
/ 
. / 
"Refugees and Politics in Uganda 11 
By 
Dr. Emmanuel Nabuguzi 
Senior Research Fellow, 
Makerere Institute of 
Social Research. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is com:-non govE:rnemtn rhetoric to talk of the granting 
of asylum as a humanitarian act. But as Loescher (1992~ 
34-51) has observed~ refugee problems are intensely poli-
tical arid their causes and consequences are intimately 
linked to political issues. ;Governments therefore have to 
walk a tight rope ~n trying to balance these considerations. 
In the host st.ates, refugee flows present re<1l and potential 
challenges to policy makers as they can exercabate tension 
and contribute to increased levels of violence in intra-
state and inter-state politics. States are therefore forced 
to include the refugee factor on their national security 
calculations. This paper seeks to examine this phenomenon 
and show to what extent these refugees have been referred 
to as an issue to influence po~itics in Uganda. I will 
start with a brief bad;:ground and theoretical framework to 
this phenomenon in Uganda, the response to this phenomenon 
by government, the re~ugees and the nationals and how all 
these culminated in the refugees invasion of Rwanda. 
BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Uganda has a wealth of experience with refugees whd:.ch pre-· 
dates its independence in 1962.. As a host state, Uganda has 
received refugees from most of the neighbouring countries 
which had been rocked by political instability forceing 
many of their citizens to flee in large influxes. The fi:cst 
wave of refugees came in 1955 from the Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium of the Sudan. 
This was followed by another wave in 1959 and 1960 from 
Rwanda and Congo Lebpoldville (now Zaire) after Belgium 
relinquished its responsibility over its former territories. 
These same countries have again, for a second time in 
their history, sent new influxes of refugees to Uganda 
between 1988 and 1992. Uganda has also received a substan~ 
tial number of refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia, the epi~ 
centre of refugee='prodocing countries inAfrica. As a · 
producer of refugees, Uganda in 1972 expelled its own 
citizens of Asian extract followed by the political and · 
c 
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academic intelligentsia. In 1980, almost the entire 
population of West-Nile and Madi region were for6ed into 
exile while that of the infamous 'Luwero Triangle 11and 
Nathe and North·~Eastern Uganda who could n9t cross 
international boundaries were labelled 'internally displaced' 
persons. As a receiver of 'returnees' , 2 Uganda in the 
latter 1980s resettled most of the Ugandan refugees that 
it had produced during the earlier regimes. In this paper, 
I will discuss only that group of people who have been 
labelled 'refugees' by the international refugee regime and 
the Uganda government. 
Who is a refugee? 
The concept 'refugee' is very elusive and has defied an 
all inclucive definition. Theoretically, a refugee is 
a person who votes with her/his feet against a state which 
is unable or unwilling to protect that person against life-
threatening conditions such as war, civil strife, hunger or 
the ~upposedly natural disasters like famine and floods 
(SHACKN~OVE 1985:274-284). But in real life, not all those 
fleeing such conditions acquire refugee status. zetter 
(1991:39-61) points out that in the realm of public policy 
and practices, a person becomes a refugee and acquires that 
status only if she/he conforms to certain institutional 
requirements as defined by the bureaucracies of those states 
or state-agencies. In other words, the word refugeee is 
simply a label which states and states-agencies decide to 
place upon somebody according to their political interests. 
This explains why some asylum-seekers can acquire refugee 
status in one state but not in the other while others are 
referred to as freedom fighters' or 'displaced persons'. 
The most commonly used conventional definition is a 
political one, the generation-old United Nations (UN) 1951 
Convention and its aecompanying 1967 Protoco13 which 
stipulate the requirements for accreditation of refugee 
status a.t individual level (UNHCf,\ HANDBOOK 1992).. In the 
Africa region, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
came up with a Convention in 1969 which recognises the 
• 
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rriass movement relating to the status of refugees is also 
widely ac'cepted . (WILEY 1991:50). In both of these 
definitions, the asylum state has the prerogativ~ to 
intepret political events in the sending state and then 
determine to whom this status be awarded. However, irispite 
of the presence of these international instruments, each 
state usually legislates who should be accorded refugee 
status. 
We can now see the definitional problems related to this 
concept 'refugee'. The theoretical one, which is more 
concerned with the humanitarian issues of safety and 
protection ••• the avowed primary purpose for the existence 
of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) •.• and the conventional or political ones 
which are concerned with the sovereign rights of the 
states that devised the definition refugee (EVANS 1991:51). 
By the time of the arrival of the refugees in Uganda and 
the sUbsequent refugee legislation, external forces were 
already dominating refugee policy. It is against this 
background that Uganda also defines who a refugee is and 
consequently determines who should be awarded refugee 
- 4 status. Prior to independence, the colonial government 
had pr~mulgated the Control of Alien Refugees Ordinance, 
1960, which for the first time in Uganda's history techni-
cally defines certain migrants as refugees. After 
independence, this Ordinance was inherited wholesale and 
adapted as The Control of Alien Refugees Act, .1964. 
Uganda also became party to the UN.refugee instruments and 
the OAU Convention in 1976 and 1989, respectively • 
. 'I'.h~ _ _per~~J2!ion~.2.f.T.~f'~ees in a host ~tati::,. 
Daley (1989) has observed that the political and economic 
conditions in a host state· together with the politics of 
the international refugee regime to a large extent deter-
mine national refugee policies. In the Ugandan context, 
the arrival of the refugees concided with the country's 
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attainment of independence in 1962. This could be , cp11side r ed 
as bad timi,_ng since Uganda was grappling with the problem of 
fulfilling the independence a spirations of its citJzens. 
:The virulent- ethnic 1 religious and monarch~cal rivalries 
which hap_ take_n on a political colour were making it diffi~ 
cul~ for the government .t o forge Uganda into one nation. 
In particular were the thorny issues of the 'Buganda Questi on', 
the Rwenzururu secessionist movement, the Karamoja problem 
and the 1964 Army mutiny5 which had put the l egitimacy of 
the nascent state at stake. Uganrt a was also having problems 
of providing essential socia l and economic s ervices to its 
people. 
The refugee s also have their own inte rests t o prot ect, such 
as their culture, and they usually b~come an added variable 
in such a fluid political situa tion. They can disrput the 
social and political order by boosting the popula tion of 
certain mino r itie s or ally thems elves with the opposition 
as a leverage to pressure their interes ts, thereby, tilting 
the political ba l ance of powe_r against government. Their 
·- ~ 
arrival in influxes can also disrupt the delivery of 
essential community social and e conomic service s and there-
fore distort the local economy as government may be compelled 
to share the little it has with the refugees or re-allocate 
more resources to certain sectors. Because governments 
normally have problems of satisfying these needs, which 
calls for the question of its ability to govern, the 
resulting para lysis is for the oppositi6n to expl oit the 
situation. The only other alternative open to government 
is to call upon the internationa l r efugee regime to assist 
it in its refugee programme which is tantamount to 
acquiescing to this regime and therefore compromising its 
independence and autonomy in prioritising on issues 
(HASTEDT and KNICKREHM l9BB).· Unde r such circumstances, 
the refugee phenomenon is bound to t a ke on a political 
rather than a humanitarian dimension. Therefore , it must 
haVe been fea~~d tha t the flui~ ~olitical situa tion (and 
therefore the cause of regugees) . in the neighbouring 
countries which was also present here might be replicated 
in Uganda. 
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On the international front, the refugees' pre sence in 
a host country can jeopardise the diplomatic relationship 
between: states, more particularly if the sending state 
is hostile or if the refugees fled because of repression. 
Therefore bestowing refugee status to them could be 
construed by one state as condemning the sending state 
for the violation of fundament al human rights and by 
the-~ 0ther as aiding and abetting 'subversives' • Secondly, 
the majority of the refugees, for good strategic, 
psychological and economic reasons prefer to self-settle 
at or near the borders of their countries of origin. In 
the first place these borders are themselves disputed. 
Also dispersed refugees especially those along the border 
are politically volatile and where guerrillas are can be 
embara3sing to the host government. This ther efore 
a lways calls f or state intervention which can culminate 
in border skirmishes.- The presence ofthe refugees in 
a hos~ state, therefore, forc es that state to take a , 
geo-political outlook in the making of decisions. 
Host states particularly in Africa tend to view the 
refugees as a unique and 'temporary' phenomenon. This 
perception arises from the belief that the cause of the 
refugee flows was· the collapsing western imperialism and 
the decolonisation process which was sweeping across 
Africa and that a s soon as this phase was over, then 
refugees would return to their countries of orogin. The 
resulting impact of this perception to policy is that 
governments do not want to include the refugees on their 
development agenda especially with regard to their 
· integration in the host communities· (NABUGUZI 1992:). 
In practice, however, weak host governments with this 
kind of fluid domestic politics tend to see the refugees 
as a threat to their power. When f aced with this kind 
of refugee challenge to their authority, host states 
react by evoking national security concerns to justify 
repre~sive solutions to problems and unite competing 
elements against threat to society (HASTEDT and 
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KNICKREHM 1988:261). Under such c ircumstances~ host 
states also tend to apply ad-hoc policies in the 
administration of the refugees (NABUGUZI 1992). 
It is this perception of the refugee s a s a 'political/ 
s e curity problem 1 , as an economic 1 burden' . and a s a 
1 temp~rary 16 phenomenon which has l ed to the policie s 
a imed at controlling~ segregating, pa cifying, depolitici-
sing and therefore marginalising the r efugees .so tha t 
~hey do not become a source of conflict in intra-state and 
inter-state politics. Uganda conforms well to this 
perception and in the section following we exaine some of 
these mechanisms and policies put into force to deal with 
the refugee phenomenon as a political issue. 
The political predicament of the refugees in Uganda starts 
with the definition of the term 'refugee'. As if suspicious 
as to who should be be accredited refugee status, the Uganda 
definition is reminiscent of the 1951 UN Convention and 
defines a refugee narrowly and strictly based on ethnic and 
setting even the arrival dateline. Statutory instrument 
No. 64-3, (1964) s ection 3 declares a refugee to be; any 
alien, being an African of the Batutsi tribe ordinarily 
resident in Rwgnda ~ .•• who enters or has entered Uganda 
on or after l November 1959 ... or ••• any alien from the 
territories formerly comprising the Belgian Congo ••• who 
enters or has entered Uganda on or aft e r 10 July 1960 ••• 
or any alien •••• from the republic of the Sudan ••• who 
enters or has entered Uganda on or after 20 December 1960. 
In addition to,this specific but narrow definition, refugee 
status is further confirmed only if two other requirements 
are fulfilled. A resident.permit had to be issued 
(REFUGEES ACT, Section 6(1) ), an indication of the 
sovereignty of a state .to determine who can reside in the 
country. Secondly, this permit can only be issued to one 
who agrees to treside in a place specified by government~ 
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implying a refugee camp (euphemistically called settlements 
in Uganda). Refugees who manage to go through this net but 
refuse to stay in their designated areas are automatically 
excluded from refugee status and are often _referred to as 
'spontaneous' in UNHCR parlance or 'illegal immigrants' in 
government parlance. 
As party to the international refugee instruments, Uganda 
is also under obligation to determine refugee status 
according to certain internationally acceptable criteria. 
As if meant to deter one from seeking asylum, the UN Instru-
ment requires member-states to f ollow an intricat e process 
in the determination of individua l r e fugee status. The 
process assumes that a refugee carries with her/him "a full 
'dossier conta ining documentation explaining and substantiat-
ing the person's background and reasons for flight, requiring 
such details as the applicant's personality, f amily social 
identity, experience as well as a thorough understanding of 
the situation in the refugee's country of origin. It also 
assume~ that the UNHCR or the government interviewing-
official has the skill, opportunity and desire to peruse and 
evaluate this information and give their interpretation of 
the displacement-causing situation 11 (EVfu~S 1991:50-51). 
This process in Africa is untenable and usually political 
considerations are normally taken into account in the award 
of refugee status~ 
In line with these international instruments, Uganda has set 
up the Refugee Eligibility Committee (REC) which determines 
individual refugee status: The legal status and the 
constitution of members of this REC has never been made 
clear as a result of which the REC mee·ts irregularly and 
government has always preferred t o use it only for 
administrative convenience to suit the whims of leaders of 
political interests of regimes in power. 
In 1982, for instance, f~llowing the political harassment 
of refugees of Rwandese origin, Uganda's erstwhile Minister 
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of Internal Affairs, J ohn LuwDliza-Kirunda 'highjacked' 
.the functions of this committee. Re fugees were seen as 
a serious political and security threat to the interests 
, o.:( the ruling Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) government~ 
thus requiring that the determination of refugee status 
t o be controlled strictly. When the REC was revived in 
1987 under the Ministry of Local Government, it begun 
co-opting members fr om organisations such as The Internal 
and External Security Organisations, an indicati on that 
government views the refugees mainly as a highly sensitive 
top political and security matter. In the determination 
of refugee status, this Committee r egards asylum-seekers 
from certain countries as a political liability and these 
are often automatically excluded fr om refugee status. 
Thus, even if some of these asylum-seekers theoretically 
~ualify for refugee status, this status is denied to them 
because Uganda considers more the political interests of 
the state than the safety and protection needs of the 
refugees; 
For instance in 1989 , Said Ba rre's Somalia, with no 
geographical boundary with Uganda, in a violation of the 
OAU principle protested to ·uganda f or awardihg refugee 
status to two Scmali fo otballers who defected while on a 
clubs tournament in N~irobi (NEW VISION 1989). Since then, 
other Somalis have sought asylum in Uganda and qualify f or 
refugee status on the basis of 'refugee sur place' but have 
been denied thi~ status and left in limbo and now survive 
in Kampala's Kisenyi .slum by subsisting on the black economy . 
- . :::-:· :- . ' -. . ' :·~ - • < . ; . - ~ . . 
Somalis are also generally referred to as 'unreliable and 
untrustworthy'. 
Kenyan asylum-seekers have also fall en victims of this 
politics of the determination of refugee status. As a 
r esult of the good cordial relationship between Obote's 
Ueanda and the Kenya government, most Kenyan asylum-seekers, 
for fear of being 'refouled', did not acquire · refugee 
status and quietly slipped out of the country having used 
Uganda only as a stepping stone to other countries. 
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t'Iuseveni's Uganda has had t o walk a tight r ope in trying 
t o balance between the political considerations of the 
state and the humanitarian protection needs of retuge es. 
Since President Museveni and the NRM7 came t o power in 
1986, Uganda has faced unexplained hostility fr om the 
government of Kenya (We~~~y_-~pic, 1990). But Kenya also 
controls the .sea port of Mombasa which is the. main gateway 
f or Uganda's imports and exports. In its asylum policy 
t owards. Kenya , Uganda has had to take into account its geo-
political position. It must have been with t hes e considera-
tions in mind that Kenyan a sylum-seeke rs, in particular 
ethnic So~ali who we r e expellled in 1989, have been denied 
refugee status. However, in 1992 f ollowing the democratisa-
tion pressure in Kenya which r esulted in producing refugees, 
Uganda openly admitted best owing r e fugee status t o 475 
Kenyans. But in accordance with its geo-political c 
consinderations, Uganda swiftly transferred them to the 
r emote Nakivale settlement on the border with Tanzania 
where they still live in some kind of confinement. 
~ 
Another mechanism set up t o deal with the r e fugees as a 
political issue is the establishment of r efugee settlements. 
These settlements are now regarded as the best places for 
controlling, and marginalising the r efugees. Usually, the 
' ,_.,_, 
establishment of settlement s chemes have an ee::momic motive. 
However, unlike the se schemes with an economic motive, 
refugee settlements have p olitical and humanitarian factors 
involved with social and economic f actors be ing disregarded 
until later in the s e ttlement history. In Uganda, refugees 
have no choice to choose their places of r es i dence irrespec~· 
tive of their status and duration of stay and s o they are 
'herded' in settlements. Moreove r, they are all r equired 
t o live in a rura l environment as if they a r e all experienced 
f armers. If any of them have any oth er skills at all, then 
the possibility of practising one's professi on are limited 
by the ru._ral frame'1ork. Those who live outside this frame-
work as self-settled refugees have only managed t o do s o 
because of government's inability and ineffectiveness to 
fully implement this settlement policy. These settlements 
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are also in accordance with the donor requirements and policy 
(DALEY 1989:204 ," KIBREAB 1989:468-489). 
But the establishment of these settlements , do not imply 
resettling the refugees permanently. Since independence, 
Uganda has alw~ys maihtained that the refugees are 
'temporary' residents and therefore preferring to keep 
them together for ease of repatriation as soon as 
conditions that had led to their flight have changed. 
The Refugees Act is very clear on this issue outlining 
what they should do as temporary residents and the 
penalties imposed if the Act is no adhered to (BAINGANA 
1989:32). 
Moreover, these settlements whether by design or mere 
coincidence with the availability of land, are physically 
isolated, often located in or bear game reserves and/or 
tsetse-infested areas •. As a result, most of them are very 
remote and inaccessible. Kibreab (1989:471) has observed 
that one of the purposes for segregating the refugee 
settlements is to ensure that the prospects of repatriation 
are not weakened by eventual cultural and social integration. 
For instance, Kyaka I was until recently located in the 
midst of a game corridor and heavily infested with tsetse 
• flies. Kyangwali, is surrounded by the government protected 
Bugoma forest and the escarpment towards Lake Albert is 
still cut off from the rest of the world ':for most of the 
time during the year. Apart from Ibuga which is located 
near an urban centre and along a motor Highway, all other 
settlements including those newly established since 1987 
for the Sudanese refugees in Moyo district follow an almost 
similar pattern. 
As if this physical i~olation were not enough, the refugee 
settlements in Uganda are fenced, albeit, bureaucratically. 
In some other parts of the world, sueh as Hong-kong, refugees 
live in closed camps which are_fenced physically with barbed 
wire and its inmates not allowed to move out. In Uganda, 
refugees live in.closed camps which are fenced 
ll 
bureaucratically with dictatorial management, restrictions 
on mobility and bureaucratic harassment. A refugee requires 
~ movement permit to move in or out of a settlement. Even 
local Ugandans who live within the vicinity of the settlement 
including the local government administrative chiefs within 
whose jurisdiction the settlement supposedly falls, have to 
get permission to enter a refugee settlement (REFUGEES ACT 
1964: Art. 14). Until 1980, refugees were not even allowed 
to engage in meetings of any nature including those 
concerning their welfane or cultural activities. Thus, the 
refugees who had run away from terror found themselves in 
a prison-like situation. 
To ensure adherence to these restrictions, government has 
appointed officers called 'Commandants' (again euphemistic) 
whom it has given excessively enormous powers of enforcement. 
They control and monitor the activities and movements of the 
refugees and issue movement permits. They can fine or arrest 
a recalcitrant without a warrant of arrest and lock up the 
vic~im for a 'limited' period of time in lock-up cells in 
the settlements (Section 21-22). Also to ensure the isola~· 
tion:and segregation of the refugees from the Ugandan 
administrative bureaucracy, government has set up a parallel 
administration for the refugees with 'commandants' reporting 
to senior 'commandants' in charge of larger refugee zones 
who in turn report directly to Kampala headquarters, thereby 9 
bypassing the local district authorities. Since 1987 
government efforts to involve these local authorities in 
the administration of these settlements are being met with 
resistante by the already institutionalized refugee 
bureaucracy. 
After government has provided the land for their settlement, 
the refugees are left in the hands of the international 
refugee regime to feed them and provide them with the 
necessary basic facilities.· In 1964, Uganda, out of its 
inability and ineffectiveness to deal with the refugee 
situation alone within the confines of its sovereignty 
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invited tQ.e UNH9B- for assistance in the management of its 
ref~gee programme. This has had tremendous political 
implications .. 
In the first place Uganda internationalised the refugee 
problem and acquiesced t o the UNHCR its responsibility for 
the management of its refugee policy. Since access ion t o 
the international refugee instruments, Uganda's refug~ 
policies have been donor-driven, implying that Uganda has 
to treat the refugees according to certain internationally 
acceptable standards such as the freedom of movement and 
parity with nationals in access ing to employment and 
education. These are contrary t o Uganda's refugee.- l aws 
and the desired policy of giving pri ority to Ugandans.-
One of the reasons why Uganda had to delay the ratification 
of these international refugee instruments is tha t it 
disagreed over the issues of parity with the refugees 
particularly in the fields of education, naturalisation 
and land acquisition (Cabinet . Memo 1968). · The government, 
therefore, has had to compromise its autonomy in decision-
r,laking because of the refugee f actor . Since 1987, UNHCR 
has been urging government to revise its refugee l aw so 
that it is brought in line with these international 
instruments. 
Seyondly, by 'targeting' relief assistance, UNHCR 
strengthens the government policy of is ol ating, segregating 
and therefore demobilising the refugees. Kar adawi (1983:540) 
has observed tha t a major aim of refugee policy has been t o 
use international assistance handed out in camps as a method 
of creating dependency with refugees as virtual r ecipients 
aJld thereby pacifying and depoliticising them. In this way 
the refugees are stripped of their political and civil rights 
and are expected t o conform and accept directives from the 
state and the donors (DALEY· 1989:252). UNHCR therefore had 
to support and even influence tpe est?-blishment of these 
organised settlements by providing the necessary basic 
infra-structure and facilities in f orm of buildings, roads, 
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education, water, health and f ood ration. As a r esult 
of this policy, the 1960s s aw a proliferation of r e fugee 
settlements with eight in the South and four in Northern 
Uganda. 8 These settlements t oday still comprise the main 
cornerstone of Uganda's r e fugee policy in the 1990s with 
new ones having been r e cently open2d f or the newly arrived 
Sudanese refugees. 
According to UNHCR, it is assumed that assistance 'targeted ' 
to the settlements reaches the right benefi ci ari es , helps 
to avoid 'leakage' to the nationals living adjacent to the 
settlement, acceler a t es the r efuge es ' attainment of food-
s elf-sufficiency and 'integration' in the host community, 
l<:eeps them contented with camp life and the r e fugees :cease 9 
a t least, to be a burden to the government and the donor 
community. With the provision of these f aciliti es and 
government meting its authoritarian administration through 
'commandants', the administra tion of r efugee settlements 
on the principle of 'tot al institutions' 9 i s completed . 
In the third place , one of the consequences of UNHCR's 
polrcies of 'targeting' i s that the ma j ority of the 
r efugees who a r e self-settled ( and moreover assisted more 
by the nationals) are not oft en r ecognis ed nor even 
registered as r e fugees. Accor ding t o UNHCR, these ar e 
a ssumed t o be well 'integrated ' in the l ocal community and 
a re not in ne ed of ass istance . As a result, the se self-
. settled refugees a re more vulnerable t o political 
manipulation in times of political uphe avals such as 
those common to Uganda. They ar e sometimes f orced by 
such circumstances t o regularise their migratory status 
by agre eing to li~e in settlements. 
The OAU has also had tremendous impact on memter-states 
behaviour towards this refuge e phenomenon. The OAU has 
been described by some observers as a club of l eaders 
enacting policies aimed a t maintaining their own survival 
(DALEY 1989:106). The ma j ority of the fram ers of the OAU 
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Convention were the producers of these refugees and .they 
feared the conse~uent political re2urcussi ons of t heir 
actions. Certain clauses were therefore deliberately 
added to the Convention to protect their intePes;ts. For 
· instance, the OAU Convention of 1969, though recognises that 
the granting of a sylum is not to be regard~d as an unfriendly 
act (Art 11(2)), imposes certain restrictive codes on the 
activities of the refugees which member-states are obliged 
to enforce. For instance, they have to ensure that the 
refugees do not use host-ground or other facilities such 
as the press or the radio to - launch what is called 
1 subversive' acti v·i ties against their countries of origin 
(Art III (2)); the refugees must be located at a 
'reasonable' distance from the borders of their countries 
of origin (Art II (6) ). This fits in very well with 
Uganda's refugee policies of controlling and ,marginalising 
the refugees so that they do not become a source of inter-
state conflicts. 
But the.. refugees have not always been a pasive lot and 
mere recepients of relief and regul ations dished out to 
them in the settlements. To demonstrate their resistance 
to the settle~nts and the oppressive conditions there, 
some of the refugee s preferred outright self-settlement 
inspite of the provision of fre~ facilities there. The 
1969 statistics indicate that out of an estimated refugee 
population of 168,000, only one-third of them were in 
settlements and this picture has not changed much today. 
The recent 1992 refusal of the ma jority of the -Zairois 
refugees who had camped at Bundibugyo and Bwera to be 
relocated in the settlements is a further indication of 
the refugees defianc.e of this policy (NEW VISION 1992). 
Other refugees iri the settlements started leaving them 
individually and in small numbers probably with the 
objective · of maintaining t~e struggle back home. 
Kyangwali in particular has had a lot of out-migration 
· since its inception because of remoteness, resurgence 
of tsetse fl±es and the oppressive settlement conditions. 
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Naturalisation 
The Uganda Citizenship Act (Part II (3)-l) provides for 
the naturalization of ·aliens who have been resident in 
• the country for at least five consecutive years and can 
speak one of the local Ugandans vernacular languages or 
English. Unfortunately, the refugees are the only aliens 
denied this right. The Refugees Act states clearly that, 
npor the purposes of the Immigration (Contr ol ) Act and the 
Uganda Citizenship Act no period spent in Uganda as a 
refugee shall be deemed to be residence in Uganda" ( Art 18 
(2) ) . Thus, the denial of naturalization t o the r efugees 
has ensured that they are politically demobilised and 
marginalised in Uganda's social and p olitical affairs. 
In spite of the institution of these mechanisms, the 
refugees pave not been deterred from presenting challenges 
to pol±cy-makers as evidenced by the self-se ttlemtn of the 
refugees and their individual out-migration from the 
settlements. In the absence of a political constituency 
through which they could articulate their views and 
interests, the r e fugees have sometimes had to go underground 
by forming clandestine political organisations, make tactical 
political alliances ~ thereby presenting additional 
challenges and becoming a political force to reckon with. 
In the 1960s, the Rwandese formed the RwanC.a Youth Movement 
and the INYENZI10 to champion the struggle against their 
. home country. The latter was particularly active in 1962 
, and 1964 when it launched several attacks on Rwanda . 
Government response to this was to prescribe the two 
organisations and their ieaders dealt with (AIDE J.VIEMOIRE 
1962) • . -CJ3ut- as will be indicated :. _ter, the Rwandese refugees 
,- ' ' ~ .- . ' 
were to adopt other measures in a bid to get a politieal 
constituency through whi ch they could articulate their 
interests. The Sudanese formed an active guerrilla movement 
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called ANYANYA11 which was also active on the Ugamia/Sudan 
border. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Sudanese African 
National Union (SAND) which had fled to Uganda also remained 
politically active inside Uganda. In 1964, government 
:('esponded to this challenge by arresting its leader, Joseph 
Oduho, allegedly for engaging in political activities and 
amassing an army to invade Sudan; (SOKIRI 1972:9-12). 
The year 1967 saw a sudden rounding up and removal of the 
Sudanese refugees of Kuku community who had been self-
settled in Moyo at least for the last five years. The 
reason for their removal was their alleged support for 
subversive activities. In that year, in an effor"t to _ 
eliminate the refugee 'problem', the Uganda Government had 
colluded with the Khartoum Government to annihilate the 
Anyanya opposition forces. The Anyanya retaliated in 1967 
by attacking the Uganda army positions at the border town 
of Moyo. Government repulsed them but revenged on the self-
settled Sudanese Kuku refugees near the border, ransacking 
and burning their homes, accusing them of having supported 
and guided the Anyanya (SOKIRI 1972:9). Thus, the refugees 
for the first time became pawns in the political game of 
international politics between Uganda and her neighbours. 
Government response was the immediate removal and transfer, 
and moreover without warning or preparation, of all the 
self-settled Kuku community to Ibuga (now part of Kasese 
District) in an environment culturally and socially 
different and distant from the Sudan. 
In November 1989 and February 1990, the Khartoum government 
war planes bombed the Uganda border town of Moyo inflicting 
serious casuali ties with six dead (FQf1!.§_.0}T_~UGj\NDA 1991). 
It is highly suspected that the reasons for this attack 
was NRA's alleged support for the opposition Sudanese 
people's Liberation Army {SPLA) some of whose members were 
mixed among the Sudanese self-settled refugees living near 
tt.e border, which is cont:rlary to OAU regulations. Indeed 
Sudanese refugees, this tirne of Made ethnicity (same as the 
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Ivradi of Uganda) had self-settled· in places like Afogi, which 
were hardly three miles · from the common border. Government 
responded to this bombardment by issuing a statement to the 
effect that all Sudanese refugees in Moyo District (including 
those in the government-recognised Magburu refugee settlement) 
would be relocated to another place, preferably Kiryandongo 
in Masindi District 9 again a place far removed from their 
familiar social-cultural setting among the Madi. 
This Sudanese' government behaviour should not have come as 
a surprise to the Ugandan authorities as Uganda itself had 
earlier on in 1983 committed similar atrocities against ~ts 
o~m citizens when they were r e fugees in the Sudan, an 
indication that the refugees are regarded as a political 
rather than a humanitarian problems. 
The fear of the refugees as ·a ·political and security threat 
is also~ - further exemplified by the decision of the three 
East African Heads of states to collude in the violation 
to the presidency, the Trio, perhaps in a bid t o preserve 
their political survival, colluded in 1983 to swap refugees 
that were considered a major threat in each other's state. 
The Obote II period saw the 'repatri ation ' of Ugandan 
refugees from Kenya among the most prominent of whom was 
Balaki Kirya, the current Minister of State f or secutiry, 
who , on his return was immediately incarcerated in Luzira 
maximum prison. This was followed by the expulsions of 
many Ugandan 'criminals' from Kenya. Presidents Moi of 
Kenya ,and Nyerere of Tanzania on their part swapped the ~ •. 
leaders of the fail ed attempted coups against their govern-
ments. Thus, refugees were once again being used as pawns 
in the political game. 
:r.h.t;..,. chasing of tq~-.J~-~E.l._a,Ewanda (Rwandese). 
The year 1982 saw the poli t·ical harassment of the Banyarwanda 
ethnic group in the districts of Bushenyi and Mbarara 
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districts. This ethnic gr oup include s t ,he Banyarwanda of 
Ugandan national·i ty and the Banya rwanda refugees who are 
of Rwanda nation ality. As a result of the self-settlerrmt 
of many Rwandese refugees and the out-migr,ation from the 
settlements and the subsequent mixing up with their 
Ugandan kinsmen , the line between the Ugandan Banyarwanda 
and Banyarwanda r efugees had become blurred. ·Therefore 
the 1982 political haras sment did not differentiate between 
the two communities. 
Obote had always been suspicious that the Banyanwanda could 
easily tilt the political bal ance of powe r against him. 
Unlike the ruling protestant dominated UPC, the Banyarwanda 
were mostly Roman Catholics by r eligion and therefore 
branded supporters of the opposition Democr atic Party (DP). 
Unlike the r epublican UPC~ they were a lso monarchists and 
it was feared that they could easily ally with their fellow 
monarchists~ the Baganda, who f ormed the single l a rgest 
economic and political power block in the country, and 
tear u~ the tenuous UPC/KY coalition government. The 
exiled Umwami (King) of Rwanda, Kigeri IV, had already be en 
offered accommodation at Mengo, Buganda 's capital. 12 
Obote's response was to expel the Umwami fr om Uganda in 
1963. In 1969, he instituted s oc i a l discrimination of the 
refugees in education and employment befor e announcing 
their expulsion, 1_.ut implementation of these were only 
postponed by the 1971 Amin coup. 
On return to the presidency in 1980 , Obo~e set out t o 
complete his designs on the Rwandese refugees . Still 
suspicious of their support for the opposition DP, Obote 
once again in a stark violation of the prir).ciple of . non-
refoulement (Art 33) order ed the expul s i on o f the .Banyarwg.nda . 
Together with his cronies ••• Ministers, senior party 
offici als and Youth Wingers ••• Obote or chestrated and 
supported their harassment, destruction and appropriation 
of properties. Some l ost their live s. About 30,000 of 
them are said to have f ound 'safe havensr in the settlements 
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of Nakivale and . Oruchinga and another 40 9 000 is estimated 
to have fled the country altogether to neighbouring 
Tanzania and Rwanda (KANYEIHAMBA 9 HARRELL-BOND 1986:28). 
The official government opposition DP condemned the 
expulsions but was unable or too ineffictive to turn it 
to its political advantge. Instead, Museveni's opporition 
NRA which had decided to wage a bush war against the Obote 
Government took advantage of the political turmoil by 
recruiting many Rwandese refugees in their ranks. After 
the 1990 October invasion 9 the Chief Political Commissar 
in the NRA Lt. Col. Serwanga Lwanga admitted that the 
Rwandese refugees joined the NRA purely for their survival 
following their persecution in 1982 by the UPC government 
():I_E;;W VISION 1990) • 
Obote later on yielded to international pressure to stop 
this harassment. In 1983 9 a Tripartite Legal Task Force 
comprising Uganda, Rwanda and UNHCR was set up to identify 
the displaced persons with each country being required to 
resettle persons who were found to be its own citizens 
(UNHCR 1984). However, given the political sensitivity 
of this refugee issue at the time, the work of this 
committee was frustrated by.government and the results were 
never made public. Instead, government's response was the 
establishment of the Kyaka II refugees settlement perhaps 
as a reminder to the refugees that they are supposed to 
live only in a place designated by government, It was also 
. 
as a result of these events that the Minister of Internal 
Affairs 'highjacked' the functions of the REC in 1982. 
Meanwhile Rwandese refugees who fled to Rwanda found them-
selves confined to camps and only survived persecution 
there by claiming to be Ugandan Banyarwanda. 
It is common official rhetoric in Uganda to talk of 
refugees as having been 'integrated' in the Ugandan 
community. It has always been assumed that this 
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'integration' has been accelerated by the hospitality of 
the nationals, the refugees' cultural and linguistic 
affinity with the nationals, government's generosity in the 
allocation of land for refugees' exclusive, use and the 
UNHCR's 'targeting' of relief assistance. The refugees had 
by 1970 attained a certain level of self-sufficiency in 
food production and were no longer dependent on food rations, 
but this is quite often erroneously equated with integration 
and having achieved 'parity' with the nationals. 
A very simple definition of integration would be of a 
situation in which the refugees become accepted by the 
host society and the two communities are able to co-exist 
sharing the same economic and social resources with no 
greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the 
host community (HARRELL-BOND 1986:7). The Ugandan 
experience, however, shows that this integration is 
hampered by or even comes under direct attack as a result 
of government policies which do not create a conducive 
atmospQere for this integration. Instead, government has 
preferred to marginalise the refugees by developing refugee 
settlements separately as donor enclaves and its inmates 
not allowed to mix freely and participate in the country's 
economic, social and political affairs. Government has even 
excluded them from all its integration and development 
projects. It is this separate development v.,rhich has marred 
the relationship between the refugees and the nationals, 
the refugees and government and nationals and their 
government. 
In 1964 when government was contemplating resettling the 
refugees in Toro, the Rukurato (Assembly) of the Toro 
Kingdom which was already experiencing secessionist 
tendencies with its Bamba/Bakonjo ethnic minority group 
had recommended that in order to avoid future friction 
between the new settlers and the indigenous people living 
adjacent to the settlement, the refugees should be mixed 
among the local people so that tney do not form a sense of 
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belonging to a different community (MPYISI 1964). If this 
·advice had been heeded, perhaps many of the disputes .that 
ensued between the two communities would have been avoided. 
In 1964, OXFAM, aUK-based development agency~ having 
reali~ed that the presence of the refugees was placing 
enormous constraints on the already fragile infrastructure 
and could result into conflict recommended that an integrated 
rural development plan involving the refugees and the 
nationals be started in the refugee-affected districts of 
Bunyoro, Toro, Acholi and Karamoja (Betts, 1964). However, 
in 1968 after the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
he.d handed in the feasibility study report of this proposal, 
Uganda's Minister of Planning~ J. Okae, informed the UNDP 
Representative that this plan had been scrapped as government 
was more interested in developing the rural people. and not 
the refugees (OKAE 1968). 
In the day-to-day relations between the two communities, 
these refugee policies have also promoted local trjbal 
politics and physical clashes inStead of integration. One 
consequence of the policy of 'targeting' relief assistance 
is that in the 1960s, these settlement with their more 
elaborately well-designed buildings were like enclaves 
amidst the surrounding Ugandan villagers who were living 
in abject poverty and deprivation. They had well-built 
administrative headquarters, schools and dispensaries in 
permanent materials and were also equipped with ambulances, 
tractor hire services, cattle dips and valley dams 
(NABUGUZI 1992:39-40). Uganda which had just emerged .from 
colonialism and still had a weak economy could not afford 
to provide these facilities to its own cit:Lzens. Wiley 
(1991:66) has rightly observed that the perceived treatment 
that the refugees receive in camps instead promotes the 
negative feelings of ••• envy ••• jealousy and hostility. 
The local Ugandans were later to resent the attention and 
assistance targeted to the refugees exemplified by the many 
land disputes. 
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The land' dispute in Rwamwanja Re·fugees Settlement best 
illustrates this·. When the author was on mission in 1987 
to investigate the causes of the dispute, it was discovered 
that the remoteness of Rwamwanja, once a hind.erance to 
development, had been eradicated because of UNHCR's provi-
sion of infrastructural facilities. The area around the 
settlement had become prime land. A number of na tionals 
including officials of the local district authority of 
Kabarole who were supposed to solve the problem had already 
acquired land titles in the disputed areas even before the 
dispute could be resolved. Unfortunately 9 this dispute 
culminated in the murder of the RC III Chairman of the 
area who had been very.vocal in the articulation of the 
interests of the nationals, a factor which strained 
further the relationship between the two communities 
(RWAMV!ANJA COMMISSION REPORT 1987). 
Government assumed that the cause of animosity between the 
refugees and the nationals was the lack of clear boundaries 
of.the~settlements. Hitherto , all refugee s ettlements, save 
Kyaka II, had only gazetted status since 1964. Instead of 
helping to cultivate good relations between the two warring 
factions, government with the support of UNHCR, decided 
that all refugee settlements be surveyed and properly 
demarcated with survey beacons indicating the boundaries 
clearly. By demarcating refugee settlements at the height 
of the disputes, it appears as if government was ratifying 
its policy of sealing off, segreg3.ting and isolating the 
refugees completely. ·Even in the. 1990s, government is 
still grappling with the problem of demarcating the 
settlements. 
Since the arrival of the new influxes of refugees, local 
. ugandans have been very. apprehe_n_sive about the issue of 
land allocation for the refugees use. In Southern Uganda 
· were refugee/nationals relationships have been characterised 
by animosity in the past, the local peopl_e are reluctant to 
avail land on the pretext of land shortage and population 
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increase. But . in Moyo, now home t o' over 90,000 Sudanese 
refugees, becaus·e of the perceived development that the 
refugees bring al~ng through their attraction of inter-
national capital, the issue of availing land f or the 
refugees settlement took on a political colour along the 
lines of the distribt 1 s East-West division. East Moyo 
(or Adjuman) in spite of its land scarcity, but because of 
the perceived development that the r e fugees would bring, 
has always claimed that it can avail enough land. vli th 
the support of UNHCR which prefers to have all refugees in 
one area for ease of administration, the East has slowly 
been allocating small bits of land. The West which had 
always coveted Adjuman's development brought about by the 
r efugees presence there even supported the government 
decision in 1990 to relocate the Sudanese refugees away 
from district. 
The ad~hoc nature of ~ganda's refugee policies also 
marginalises them even further. In spite of its long 
experience with refugees, Uganda has no well documented 
coherent refugee policy to speak of. Instead, successive 
governments have resorted to the use of 'ad-hocism' in 
dealing with ·refugee matters by taking measures and issuing 
. . . 
stunning statements that suit the whims or political 
interests of the leaders in poweP. hefugees are legally 
and politically vulnerable and can there~ore be easy 
victims of such statements and measures. In this section 
we examine some of t'hese ad-hoc policies show to what 
extent these refugees have been used as pa-vms in Uganda 
politics. 
This 'ad-hocism' in r e fugee matters is best exemplified 
by the constant relocation of the department of refugees 
from one Ministry to another according to the r)'6ii tical 
interests of the regime in power, thus, reTl§'8t'irtg the 
level of priority that each regime attached to ;·i 1ts refugee 
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situation. In 1971, Amin transferred the department from 
the Ministry of Community Development to that of Defence 
and Internal Affairs, reflecting Amin's closer ties and 
identification with the refugees. In l982t Obote relocated 
it to the Ministry of Internal Affairs because of his 
suspicions of the Rwandese_refugees. In 1987, reflecting 
the NRM mood of sympathy and clos e r ties with the refugees, 
government relocated the department to the Ministry of Local 
Government where it is now hoped tha t with its grassroots 
n etwork it could play the best r ole in 'integrating' the 
refugees into the Uganda society. With the refugees now 
being incre asingly seen a s a security problem, it is not 
certain tha t this department will r ema in where it is 
currently. 
Given the shaky ground on which the UPC government stood, 
coupled with the problems of satisfying the citizens' 
independence aspirations, Obote has always found it 
imperative to invoke the refuge e factor in r allying the 
support of the elites to his side . In 1964, the Ministry 
of Public Service wa s instructed not to employ refugees 
while the Uganda Federation of Employers was to give 
priority .to Ugandans in the recruitment of employees 
(MPYISI 1964). In a 1969 Communication from the Chair, 
President Obote stunned the refugees when he ordered that 
they should return t o t heir countries of origin (SOKIRI 
1972:12). This statement was accompanied by two decrees in 
1970, one, requiring all employers, government and private, 
to disengage all foreigners (refugees inclusive), and 
another one barring all institutions of higher learning 
from admitting any Rwandese or Sudanese refugee students. 
Obote repeated his expulsion orde rs in 1982. 
Amin wanted to show a difference between himself and Obote 
and s o he repealed the Obote decrees and set a policy of 
rapproachement towards the refugees. A descendant of the 
Nubians whom Captain Lugard has used a century eatlier as 
' . 
mercenaries to enhance the political interests of the 
i 
.. 
-· 
·. \ 
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British in Uganda, Amin s aw a political advantage in allying 
with the refugees. Prior to the 1971 coup, Amin as Army 
commander had become suspicious of Obote's r apid promotion 
of his ethnic Acholi and Langi soldiers. He took advantage 
of his position t o also r ecruit heavily into the Army peopl e 
if his cho ice, refugees inclusive. Thus, refugees were f or 
the first time empl oyed .in Uganda 's security organisations. 
Among his most prominent ·sudanese props in the Army were 
Lt. Col. Sule (Bari ethini city), Commanding Officer of the 
~ . 
Masaka Mechanised Brigade and Brigadier Hussein Malera 
(Baka ethnicity), the chief of r1ilitary Police , who after 
successfully quelling Charles Arube's a rmy l ed coup agains t 
' ! .• 
Amin in 1974 was highly-rewa rded before his r epatriation 
to the Sudan. 
Amin had also be come persona l fri end of the Umwami, Kigeri IV, 
whom he had invited to return t o Uganda and even offered him 
state ac_commodation. As a result of these cl ose ties with 
the Umwami, some RwandesE; refugees were also employed in 
a number of state security organizations . 
rJiuseveni' s rapproachement ·with the refugees had started 
during the NRM's bush war against Obote and the Okello 
junta. Since 1986, the NRM government has employed many 
Rwandese refugees in the sec~rity organisations a s a 
gr a titude to their contribut~on in t he war eff orts t o r emove 
the dictatoria l regimes. They had even acquired a certain 
degree of s aliency in Uganda not seen anywhere in Africa 
with some making a meteoric rise t o the z enith of power. 
Major General Fred Rwigyema r eached the very high rank of 
Depurty Army Commander and Deputy Minister of the powerful 
Defence portifolio. Other notabl e Rwandese r efugee s in 
high ranks include Maj or Paul Kagame, Acting Director of 
the Milita ry Intelligence, Ma j or Chris Bunyenyezi, 
. . 
Commanding Officer of the 306 Brigade, Major;_l?e,ter }~dingana , 
Head of NRA Medical Services, Lt. Col. Adam jl<?-f3Wa, 
•• 1 •• 
Commanding Officer, Soroti and Ma jor Kalis oliso Nduguteyi ••• 
· .. 
all of whom were involved in the initial attack on Rwanda. 
·' 
/ 
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IVIuseveni's open support f or th e refugees could also be 
seen in the civilian institutions. When he int roduced 
his brand of people's popular democra cy at grassroots levelf 
the Resistance Councils (RCs), non-nation~ls, refugees 
inclusive, were allowed full participation in these RCs. 
Even when the refugees were excluded from the RC system as 
a result of internationa l pressure against their involvement 
in !l.B~?J-i ti.<?.E3.L .t~~~J"lu_E)eveni gove...£,£.ment, _ _§til~ determined 
t o allow a certain measure of democratisation in the r e fuge e 
settlements allowed them to operate Refugee Wlfare ~uncils 
more or less on the s ame principle a s RCs a t the lowest l evel. 
RPF AND THE INVATION OF RWANDA 
On l October 1990, Rwandese-Tutsi r e fugees decided to 
return to Rwanda by use of force. A cl andestine 
organisation calling itself the Rwandese Patriotic Front 
(RPF) had secretly amassed an Army that carried out the 
initial attack. Uganda, and in particular President IVIuseveni, 
has been accused of being behind this attack. Although the 
~ 
conditions for this attack were conducive and coincided with 
the Museveni era, with or without him the Rwandese refugees 
were left with n o other alternative. 
The Rwandese refugees inspite of their thirty-year·long 
stay have always ye arned for a return home. This nostalgia 
for home has been fuelled more by Uganda's refugee policies 
which have ensured that the refugees a re isolated, segrega .. 
ted, viewed as 'temporary' residents and therefore denied 
haturalisation, integration and a political constituency 
through which they could articulate their views and interests ~ 
the policies also led t o waves of xenephobia in which the 
Rwandese have always been portrayed, moreover in derogatary 
terms, as foreigners. For instance, earthy Watson says of 
Rwigyema that his prominence caused j ealousy and that even 
if" he fought all Uganda's wars from Amin through Obote-to 
Lakwena; there were alvrays people to dismiss him with a 
sne~:t' s aying he was not by birth a Ugandan '(NEW VISION. '1990). 
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The current debate on the prop6sed -naturalisation of the 
refugees as re~ommended by the Odoki Draft Constitutional 
Report to which UPC has alluded that it makes it easier 
for the Rwandese to become citizens (NEW AFRICAN, April 
1993), and the current arguement as to whether the 
Kinyarwanda or Urufumbira language be allowed on state 
radiO is still a reflection of this xenephobia. 
On the international front the Rwandese refugees felt they 
had been forgotten. Where as countries such a s Zaire and 
the Sudan made attempts to repatriate some of th~ir 
nationals, the Rwanda government remained ambivalent about 
it. Rwanda had always been unhappy with voluntary 
repatriation as provided f or in the internatibnal 
Conventions, instead preferring that the refugees be 
naturalised in their current hos t states. Ironically, it 
was President Museveni who on coming to power in 1986 
initiated a series of diplomatic and regionhl summits 
culminatingin the Kigali declaration of 27 Novembe r 1986 
. . -
in -whiCh the issue of government t o government repatriation 
of the refugees was included on the agenda for the first 
time in the summit history (JOINT COMMUNIQUE, November 1986). 
Negotiations with Rwanda stalled in 1986 and 1987 when the 
government initially denied the existence of its citizens 
as refugeees outside and at other times claimed it had 
economic and demographic constra ints (WEEKLY' TOPIC 1986). 
These fears that they had been forgotten seem t o have been 
echoed further in 1989 when UNHCR, because of its cash 
crisis, cut off funds for the support of Rwande se refugees 
(NEW VISION 2/3/1989). Thus, with no prospects for 
naturalisation and integration in Uganda, denied by their 
home state and forgotten by UNHCR, the Rwandese refugees 
felt they had been left in limbo. They found themselves 
- -
left with the·only alternative of organising themselves 
militarily to invade Rwanda.- Even their mobilisation was 
made possible and easier because of these refugee policies. 
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Malkki's ethnogrpahy, as quoted by Karadawi (1983:540), 
on the refugee camp situation in Tanzania has indicated 
that the condition of the concentration of the refuge es 
were favourable to the f ormation of a parti-cular type of 
historical and political consci ousness. Thus, far from 
contributing to the intended goal of depoliticisation and 
control, the context of camp life ins tead pr ovides people 
with the opportunity to engage in the creative activity 
of interpreting their flight and articulating and construct~ 
ing a collective narrative concernin~ the common past. It 
is because of thi s factor that the Rwandese in Uganda have 
been able to stren gthen their cohesion, making it possible 
to politicise and mobilise their second and third generation 
with ease. 
In 1980, the Rwandese r e fugee le ader ship managed t o hoodwink 
government and registered the Rwandes Refuge e Welfare 
Founda tion (RRVVF) supposedly as a welfare associ ati on .. 
The political activities of the refugees were being handled 
by anotber secret organisation, INKOTANYI, which operated 
in the settlements under the cover of RRWF. In alliance 
with the Nairobi-ba sed Rwandese Alliance of Nati onal Union 
(RANU), INKOTANYI transformed itself into the RPF which 
this time made no secret of their organis ation and intentions . 
On that fateful day , RPF declared wa r on the Habyarimana 
government. Uganda 's settlement and relie f ass istance 
policie§ with which it had been hoped that the refugees 
would be pacified and depoliticized had been given a death 
blow. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have seen that what was desirable by the 
r e fugee policies is not what was possible. The policies 
helped t o politicise the refuge es instead of l eading to the 
intended goal of depoliticisation, thereby, constr a ining 
state policy-making. It is, therefore, perhaps good to 
conclude this paper with some remarks on the l essons 
' ' 
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learnt and the implications of Uganda's refugee policies 
to policy-makers. 
The much espoused policy o~ control in the settlements 
instead strepgthens the refugees by.maintaining their. 
cultural identtity, thereby, helping the refugee leader-
ship in effect~vely mobilising.them for political 
purposes. The Rwandese invasion is a clear manifestation 
of the failures of these policies and the inability of a 
host state to implement them. If a host state can make 
use of the refugees for political purposes during their 
'temporary' residence, like the NRM government has done, 
then it can also reformulate its policies by discarding 
the control measures so as to enable their integration 
and make use of their much more useful economic potential. 
For the OAU and, in particular, the refugee-producing 
countries, .the success of the Rwandese inve3.tiop have shovm 
that they can no longer indefinitely lock out their 
citizens as refugees by hoping that host states will 
contr~l and keep the refugees at a 'reasonable' distance 
from the border. A decade earlier, Ugandan refugees 
with the assistance of their .Tanzania host state carried 
out a similar attack on Uganda. In order to stop 
re-inventing the wheel, Uganda in conjunction with the 
rest of the world- commun.ity ought to change its policies 
and address the real causes and solutions to the refugee 
phenomenon. In parti<m.1lar, Uganda should revisit its. 
decac1ent 1964 .Control of Alien Refugees Act whose excessive 
restrt~tions are not only contrary toe the international 
instruments (to which it is party) but is also dehumanising 
apd a Yiolation of the ~undamental human rights of the 
refugees. 
l. 
2. 
3 . 
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l. The Luwero Triangle refers mainly to the district of 
Luwero, Mpigi and Mubende to the North of the capital 
Kampala in which Museveni's opposition army concentrated 
t heir war activities against the Obote and the Okellos 
governments. • 
2. Returnees is new coinage referring to, people who.have 
previously been refugees and are still in a situation of 
asset deprivation which is very much similar to that of 
the refugees. 
3. The requirements for the accreditation of the illJ 
refugee status include ••• a 'well-founded fear of~ 
persecution', being outside the country of nationality, 
lack of protection of the country of nationality, and 
lack of protection for stateless persons. The OAU 
Convention, in addition to the inclusion of the persecution 
clause, ·broadens the UN definition further to encompass 
anything that d,:Lsturbs public order, such _as famine, and 
forces one to quit his/her place of habitual residence. 
4. See page 9 for Uganda.' s definition of a refugee. 
5. Buganda is the single largest ethnic political and 
economic bloc in Uganda which was refusing to join a 
unitary Uganda pror to and after independence. The 
Rwenzururu was a movement of the Bamba/Bakonjo ethnic 
minorities who were fighting to secede from their over-
lord •.• The Toro Kingdom and from Uganda as a whole. 
The Karamoja problem involved ·cattle rustling in the 
neighbouring districts by the Karimojong which necessitated 
the permanent deployment of government troops to protect 
the lives of people and their properties. 
6. It is argued elsewhere that the refugees are not nece-
ssarily a poli t·ical and economic burden but can be an 
economic potential to the host state. They are also 
increasingly seen as a permanent feature of life rather 
than as a temporary phenomenon. 
7. The NRM is the National Resistance Movement government 
in power since 1986; the NRA refers to the Army and the RC 
(Resistance Council) to the smallest grassroot political 
unit at parish level which is organised in tiers from level 
one as RC l to the distrivt level five or RC V. The level 
higher than this one forms the National Parliament or 
National Resistance Council (NRC). 
8. Refugee settlements created in the 1960s include ••• 
Nakapipirit, Agago, Acoli-Pi and Onigo for the Sudanese 
and Congolese in the North ••• and Oruchinga, Nakivale, 
Rwamwanja, Kahunge, Ibuga,. Kyaka, Kinyala and Kyangwali 
for the Rwandese, Since 1986, 16 new smaller settlements 
have been established in Adjuman - sub district for the 
Sudanese. 
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9. This refers to wholly institutionalised frameworks 
like prisons, hospitals or boarding schools where almost 
everything required by the inmates is provided to them. 
Organised refugee settlements could be seen as a new 
species in the genus of total institutions .because the 
refugees are there involuntarily, their participation 
denied and therefore have little or no input into decision-
making. 
10. In Kiyarwanda parlance, Inyenzi refers to a cockroach 
which persistently keeps on disturbing its victim. 
11. Anyanya (a corruption of the Madi word Inyinya , 
meaning poison) refers to the Southern Sudanese guerilla 
movement led by Joseph Lagu, himself a Sudanese Madi•·l~ 
mhYemewts fighting the Arab-dominated Khartoum government. 
12. King Kigeri IV was staying at Mengo with Mr. Sempa, 
Buganda's Minister of Finance. 
